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Introduction 
 
 
The New ‘Europe of Security’ 
Elements for a European White Paper on Security and Defence 
Annegret Bendiek 
With the Estonian Presidency of the EU Council from July until December 2017, the 
main topics will be digitalization and “a safe and secure Europe”. The Council Presiden-
cy will, therefore, be tackling Europe’s major challenges. At the same time, it can make 
use of a wide-open window of opportunity, since the governments of the EU Member 
States are more willing than ever to consider deepening European foreign and security 
policy. The issue of security has also been a constant concern for the Commission since 
the beginning of its term – from President Juncker’s Political Guidelines in July 2014 to 
his most recent State of the Union Address in September 2016. Politics and society sup-
port a ‘Europe of Security’ based on three major projects of current European policy: 
a security union, a defence union and close cooperation between NATO and the EU. 
When protecting critical infrastructures, i.e. cybersecurity, these projects merge. 
All three should be given a shared strategic vision in an overarching White Paper. 
 
Violent conflicts and upheavals in the EU’s 
eastern and southern neighbourhoods, new 
hybrid threats and terrorist attacks have 
strengthened the willingness in politics and 
society to intensify cooperation on Euro-
pean foreign, security and defence policies. 
This is the main assumption of the HRVP’s 
first yearly implementation report of the 
EUGS in June 2017. The Rome Declaration 
issued by the European Council in March 
2017 also makes it clear that the security of 
the citizens and territory of the EU is sup-
ported by politics and by a majority of EU 
citizens as a new integration narrative. 
This also means the EU wants to find a new 
purpose in a ‘Europe of Security’. Federica 
Mogherini, EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and 
Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President of the Euro-
pean Commission, responsible for employ-
ment, growth, investment and competitive-
ness, both support a deepening of security 
policy. In January 2017, they made a case 
for expanding the EU into a real defence 
union not limited to the EU-27. They 
claimed that external measures and close 
cooperation with NATO could only improve 
the security of the Union. The new ‘Europe 
of Security’ is based on three major projects 
of current European policy: a security 
union, a defence union and intensive co-
operation between the EU and NATO. All 
three are connected and have an important 
common reference point in European 
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cybersecurity. The May 2017 attack on more 
than 200,000 computer systems in more 
than 150 countries has opened our eyes to 
the fact that strictly separating internal and 
external security is problematic in protect-
ing critical infrastructure. Political activism 
in all areas of security and defence policy, 
as shown in the current implementation 
of the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) since 
July 2016, has been spurred on by the per-
ceived need to conceptualize a ‘Europe of 
Security’. 
Implementation of the EU Global 
Strategy (EUGS) 
The imminent departure of the UK from 
the EU and Donald Trump’s unpredictabil-
ity as President of the United States are the 
main motives for the EU to seriously ad-
dress its discussed but undefined goal of 
‘strategic autonomy’ in the EUGS from July 
2016. According to Trump and his govern-
ment, most European states do not do 
enough for their security. Given the meagre 
success of European transformation efforts 
in its neighbouring countries, the EU is 
now trying, with the help of the EUGS, to 
make its citizens aware of the added value 
the Union can contribute to security issues. 
In order to ensure the security of its citi-
zens and the territory of the EU, the follow-
ing priorities were stipulated in November 
2016: “(a) responding to external conflicts 
and crises, (b) building the capacities of 
partners, and (c) protecting the Union and 
its citizens”. The Union is to develop greater 
resilience, i.e. have the capability to re-
spond better to terrorist attacks, changes 
in cyberspace and hybrid threats. In order 
to achieve these aspirations, the EU will 
employ an integrated approach, that is the 
coherent use of military, civilian and eco-
nomic instruments and closer networking 
of internal and external security. In August 
2016, the Weimar Triangle states even sug-
gested creating an independent form of the 
European Council to deal exclusively with 
questions of internal and external security. 
In November 2016, the German Minister of 
Defence advocated the long-term goal of 
a European security and defence union. 
The defence and security unions, however, 
would formally be separate from each 
other. The security union project is an ini-
tiative that has been largely promoted by 
the Commission and is primarily concerned 
with issues of internal and judicial policy. 
In contrast, the defence union is a political 
project devised by foreign and defence 
ministers. Cybersecurity policy breaks 
through this line of formal separation. It 
forms an interface between the major pro-
jects of internal and external security, as 
well as of internal, external and defence 
policy in the European multilevel system. 
It is, therefore, a focal point for new chal-
lenges associated with establishing the 
security and defence unions. 
Political initiatives 
The idea of a security and defence union is 
not new, but in the past it was mainly con-
cerned with the external dimension of secu-
rity. As early as 2002, the foreign ministers 
of Germany and France, Joschka Fischer 
and Dominique de Villepin, announced 
that the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) was to be developed into a 
security and defence organization. Since 
the summer of 2016, Germany and France 
have not only been arguing the case for 
closer cooperation on defence policy but 
also for internal security. Both countries 
are committed to a “Europe of different 
speeds”. They want to focus more closely 
on flexible integration procedures, such as 
enhanced cooperation (Article 20(1) TEU), 
permanent structured cooperation (Article 
42(6) and Article 46 TEU) and constructive 
abstentions (Article 31 TEU). European secu-
rity is already variously organized along 
functional and regional lines. Not all Mem-
ber States formally participate in either 
internal security policy or defence policy. 
The UK, Ireland and Denmark make use 
of their opt-out clauses on domestic and 
judicial policy. In addition, Denmark does 
not participate in the Common Security 
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and Defence Policy (CSDP). Also, not all EU 
Member States are in NATO. This applies to 
Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Cyprus 
and Austria. 
Security union 
The security union originated from the con-
cept of an “Area of freedom, security and 
justice”. It is implemented through the 
Tampere (1999-2004), Hague (2005-2009) 
and Stockholm (2010-2015) programmes 
and is enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon 
(Article 3(2) TEU). The current Commission 
programme and restructuring of the Com-
mission go a little further. From the outset, 
their objectives were to grow a stronger 
network of internal and external security 
and have internal and external policies. 
Following the terror attacks on French 
satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, the Com-
mission presented its European Agenda for 
Security in April 2015. According to Com-
mission President Juncker, organized 
crime, terrorism and cybercrime are cross-
border challenges that represent “a com-
mon European responsibility” and create a 
deepening European cooperation within 
the framework of a European security 
agenda. One year later, in response to the 
terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, 
the Commission announced its intention to 
establish a security union. Legally, this is 
essentially based on Article 67 TFEU, taking 
into account Article 4(2) TEU and Article 72 
TFEU. Accordingly, the EU is “an area of 
freedom, security and justice”, also known 
as the Schengen area. Commissioner, Julian 
King, who was newly appointed in Septem-
ber 2016, was entrusted with the task of 
implementing “Schengen security”. He 
named his most important areas of action 
as, a) improving the legal framework for 
combatting terrorism, b) prevention and  
de-radicalization, c) improved exchange of 
information between Member States’ au-
thorities, d) the setting up of databases and 
their interoperability, e) protection of bor-
ders and f) better protection of critical 
infrastructures. Seven progress reports have 
been submitted for implementation to date. 
Among other things, a terrorist attack 
centre was set up at the European Police 
Office (Europol), arms legislation has been 
tightened and an antiterrorism directive 
and a data protection directive for elec-
tronic communication (ePrivacy Directive) 
have been issued. Police authorities in 
Europe are increasingly using data from 
different sources for their own evaluation 
and investigation activities. As a result, they 
have to cope with huge amounts of cross-
border data and forensically examine them. 
In future, Europol will play an increasingly 
important role in the transmission of per-
sonal data. So far, Europol has concluded 
operational agreements to cooperate with 
the US, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and 
Australia. At the state and EU level, infor-
mation technology will need bundled 
management. In May 2017 the Commission 
set out a new approach on interoperability 
of information systems. 
Defence union 
In its report on future EU military coopera-
tion from October 2016, the European Par-
liament called for a newly created defence 
union to facilitate closer interlocking of 
national troops and to transform battle-
groups, in existence since 2007 but never 
deployed, into standing units. In addition, 
Member States are to work together more 
intensively on the procurement of arma-
ments which currently account for around 
80 percent of solely national markets. 
According to the Commission, this practice 
generates annual costs of up to 100 billion 
euros. During his speech on the State of the 
Union in September 2016 and repeated in 
his speech on the defence union in June 
2017, Commission President Juncker urged 
Member States to more closely coordinate 
their defence efforts. At the end of Novem-
ber 2016, the Commission presented its 
European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). The 
objectives contained in it go far beyond the 
headline goals agreed in 2008. It also states 
that it should be able to lead ten civilian 
and five military operations simultaneously 
and that a European Military Planning and 
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Conduct Capability (MPCC) be set up by 
June 2017. The predominantly political 
declarations of Member States to date are 
to become more legally binding. At the end 
of November 2016, the Commission pre-
sented plans for a European Defence Fund 
to promote joint investment in research 
and development which was launched in 
June 2017. Firstly, the fund will promote 
joint research on defence technologies, 
such as electronics, meta materials, en-
crypted software and robotics. The Com-
mission has set aside 25 million euros for 
these technologies in 2017 and a further 
90 million euros by the end of 2019. In 
2018, the Commission will propose a dedi-
cated EU defence research programme with 
an estimated annual budget of 500 million 
euros. 
The multiannual financial framework of 
the EU after 2020 is to include a defence 
research programme worth around 500 
million euros per annum. Secondly, joint 
armament procurement should be made 
easier for encrypted software or helicopters. 
A more substantial programme will be pre-
pared for post-2020, with an estimated 
annual budget of one billion euros. The 
programme will leverage national financ-
ing with an expected multiplying effect 
of five. This should save five billion euros 
annually. It could, therefore, generate a 
total investment in defence capability 
development of five billion euros per year 
after 2020 according to the Commission 
communication. To achieve this, the Com-
mission wants to support the European 
Structural and Investment Funds and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) to finance 
the development of dual-use goods and 
technologies. Furthermore, general direc-
tives on the awarding of public contracts 
in the defence and security sector are to be 
extended. This should promote cross-border 
cooperation and advance the development 
of common industry standards. 
Attention is being increasingly focused 
on aspects of dual use. A series of current 
projects by the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) deal with the question of how re-
search findings can be applied equally to 
internal and external security. The first two 
research assignments were awarded to un-
manned aviation systems and mobile recon-
naissance robots for urban warfare. A third 
consortium was commissioned to develop 
an autonomous monitoring platform for 
both external and internal security. Auton-
omous reconnaissance systems, such as 
drones and sensors, are to be fitted with 
lasers and jamming transmitters in a 
‘swarm’ system (EuroSWARM) and be 
placed under central command. The EDA 
believes the technology will be particularly 
important for border control and surveil-
lance security. 
EU-NATO cooperation 
European security is not only a matter of 
improving cooperation on internal and 
external security but it is also a key action 
area within NATO. According to a frame-
work agreement from March 2003 (Berlin 
Plus), the EU is allowed to make use of 
NATO resources and capabilities in military 
operations. Joint declarations by both 
organizations in July and December 2016 
also reflect the Global Strategy’s guiding 
principle that the Union’s territory can 
only be effectively defended through coop-
eration between the EU and NATO. As a 
result, 42 measures were adopted to accel-
erate intensified cooperation in seven fields 
of action agreed at the Warsaw Summit in 
July 2016. These include defending against 
hybrid threats, early warning and situation 
on the ground, parallel operations in iden-
tical areas, cybersecurity and defence, inter-
operable capabilities, defence industry and 
research as well as exercises to strengthen 
the resilience of EU and NATO partners. The 
progress report of June 2017 on the imple-
mentation of the common set of proposals 
endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 
6 December 2016 states that ten out of the 
42 proposals are linked to the fight against 
hybrid threats. EU and NATO, along with 
Member States and Allies, are willing to 
contribute to and participate in the activi-
ties of the European Centre of Excellence 
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for Countering Hybrid Threats set up in 
Helsinki. Most Member States are in favour 
of close coordination between NATO and 
EU armed forces. All measures in the fields 
of foreign, security and defence policy 
should also, therefore, automatically 
strengthen NATO or at least complement 
its range of tasks. One example is the EU 
Hybrid Fusion Cell which was set up at the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). 
It is intended to bundle information from 
the security authorities of NATO and EU 
states, from EU institutions and partner 
countries. It is intended to act as an early 
warning system and to create a situation 
picture to defend against hybrid threats, 
such as cyber attacks. In addition, coopera-
tion with Nato will also ensure that the 
CSDP is only directed externally, there is 
no provision for territorial defence and, 
contractually, there can be no deployments 
within the EU. Nonetheless, national de-
fence is one of NATO’s core tasks as a 
defence alliance. 
Focus on cybersecurity 
Cyber attacks on states and critical infra-
structures have long been a reality. The 
quantity and quality of such attacks are 
growing steadily. Even the boundary be-
tween offensive and defensive orientation 
is fluid. If an actor has the ability to defend, 
he can also attack anywhere in the world. 
The difficulty of attributing these attacks, 
that is, the ability to clearly identify the 
perpetrator of an attack is an expression of 
the factual, political and technical limit-
lessness of cyberspace. The cyber and infor-
mation space does not recognize national 
boundaries or institutional structures. 
Cybersecurity policy is a shared area of 
competence between Member States and 
the EU level. The NIS Directive “concerning 
measures to ensure a high common level of 
network and information security across 
the Union” came into force in July 2016. 
This has created a uniform European legal 
framework to provide national cybersecuri-
ty capacities from across the EU, to allow 
for more EU-level cooperation and mini-
mum security requirements and to formu-
late reporting requirements for specific 
critical infrastructure services. Two new 
coordination mechanisms are being set up 
to put these uniform measures in place. 
A cooperation group is to support the 
strategic partnership and the exchange of 
information on cyber incidents between 
Member States, while the Computer Secu-
rity Incident Response Team (CSIRT) is 
responsible for emergency support on the 
ground. 
Cross-sectional task 
EU cybersecurity policy is based not only 
on the NIS Directive but also on the 2013 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European 
Union and the 2015 Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe. It also builds on recent 
communications on the implementation of 
the European Security Agenda from 2015 
and on defending against hybrid threats 
from 2016. Institutionally, cybersecurity at 
Council level is defined as a cross-sectional 
task and dealt with in the Horizontal Work-
ing Party on Cyber Issues (HWPCI). In crisis 
situations, cybersecurity also lies at the 
interface between civilian and military 
cooperation as well as internal and external 
security. If a major cyber incident were to 
occur, a whole series of EU institutions 
would cooperate with each other. These 
include the European Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency (ENISA), the EU’s 
Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT-EU), Europol’s European Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3), the EU’s Judicial Cooperation 
Unit, Eurojust, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, 
the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre 
(INTCEN) at the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the European Defence 
Agency (EDA). Just like the still-valid Cyber-
security Strategy, the future strategy will 
apply across all policy fields. The existing 
strategy contains five fields of action: 
Increasing resilience, combatting cyber 
crime, establishing a cyber defence, devel-
oping industrial and technical resources 
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and, finally, developing a global strategy for 
cyberspace. While European cooperation in 
the fight against cybercrime has already 
been able to boast successful investigations 
by Europol, the foreign cyber and defence 
policy so far remains the subject of well-
intentioned declarations of intent. 
Cyber defence 
The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework 
from November 2014 encourages EU Mem-
ber States to review their cyber defence 
capabilities for the CSDP and ensure they 
are complying with their alliance commit-
ments. The EU Military Staff has also called 
for better protection against cyber attacks 
on EU-led operations and missions. Cooper-
ation between the EU and NATO on cyber-
security and defence, which has intensified 
since 2015, was formalized in the Warsaw 
Declaration in July 2016 and underpinned 
by specific implementation proposals made 
at the joint meeting of the Foreign Minis-
ters of the EU and NATO countries in De-
cember 2016. In November 2016, the Euro-
pean Parliament made a strong commit-
ment to deepen cooperation on cyber de-
fence. It called on Member States to develop 
the necessary skills to achieve this in part-
nership with the EDA and the NATO Coop-
erative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(CCDCOE). The aim is for the EDA to create 
synergies between NATO and EU capability 
developments. Projects for cyber defence 
include the Collaboration Database (CoDaBa) 
and the Capability Development Plan (CDP). 
Projects on cooperation between the EU 
and NATO include early warning capabili-
ties for headquarters and a multi-agent 
system for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
detection (MASFAD). 
The ongoing review of the European 
Cybersecurity Strategy will have to take 
account of all these initiatives in internal 
and external security as well as data secu-
rity developments in the digital internal 
market. High expectations have been 
placed on the upcoming Estonian Council 
Presidency. It is hoped that, among other 
things, it will finalize the digital single 
market and increase the legal force of 
cybersecurity. Estonia is seen as a pioneer 
in the single market and, at the same time, 
it wants to further develop European cyber 
foreign and defence policy in close coop-
eration with NATO. All this points in the 
right direction, since Europe, with the 
CFSP, the EEAS and the High Representative 
for Foreign and Security Policy, is named 
as the level at which Member State security 
and defence is to be developed. 
Elements for a White Paper 
For the Estonian Council Presidency in 
2017, much will depend on the added value 
that Europe can provide on issues of digita-
lization, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). The final phase of 
the reflection process on the Commission’s 
White Paper on the future of the EU will 
also take place during Estonia’s Presidency. 
In June 2017, the Commission presented a 
longer-term reflection paper setting out 
possible scenarios for the future of EU de-
fence. The Council Presidency will not deal 
with any fundamental issues of setting EU 
foreign and security policy which, as some 
politicians have called for, should be in-
cluded in a European White Paper on Secu-
rity and Defence. The aim of a ‘Europe of 
Security’ can certainly be seen as ambiva-
lent. Should the security and defence 
unions actually develop into new core 
elements of the integration process, this 
could lead to a normative shift in the 
Union, away from the cosmopolitan de-
mands of market integration and more 
towards a protectionist integration project. 
This Europe of security and defence should 
avoid a return to its old confrontational 
patterns, security dilemmas and an arms 
race, especially in cybersecurity. The neces-
sary process of formulating a European 
White Paper on Security and Defence 
should, therefore, be supported by four 
main elements which focus on measures 
aimed at building trust and security. 
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1. The EU’s pursuit of ‘strategic auton-
omy’ is a high and, at first glance, appeal-
ing aspiration. However, it contradicts the 
idea of an increasingly interwoven and 
interdependent world in which conflicts 
are not one-sided (‘strategically autono-
mous’), but are resolved through dialogue 
and cooperation. It is, therefore, necessary 
to clarify what the term means for the EU’s 
relationship with NATO. In principle, the 
idea of strategic autonomy is in competi-
tion with the aim of consolidating the Euro-
pean and US pillars of Western security 
policy. It is, therefore, necessary to oppose 
all the demands from science and politics 
for the US to withdraw from Europe or for 
Europe to create its own nuclear umbrella. 
Instead, the nexus between the North 
American and European pillars of NATO 
should be strengthened. Furthermore, addi-
tional common armaments projects would 
have to be considered. The goal should not 
be strategic autonomy but strategic inter-
dependence. 
2. If the EU and NATO want to cooperate 
even more intensively with each other in 
future, both sides must agree on what trig-
gers the right for ‘digital self-defence’. This 
includes a joint response to the question 
whether a serious attack on critical infra-
structures should also allow ‘offensive de-
fence’, i.e. an immediate military response. 
Attacks on critical infrastructures and the 
systematic use of security gaps by private 
actors also present policy-makers with the 
problem of how defence mechanisms at 
national and European levels can be simul-
taneously coordinated and what role should 
diplomacy and the military play here. In 
its White Paper 2016 on German Security 
Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 
the Federal Government warned that ter-
rorist organizations used “social media 
and digital communication to generate re-
sources, attract supporters, spread propa-
ganda, and plan attacks”. Increasingly, they 
are able to use cyber capabilities to attack 
targets or use chemicals in assassination 
attempts. Even the use of biological and 
radioactive substances cannot be complete-
ly ruled out in future. 
How would the EU in question state 
react? What forms of action are permitted 
under the common defence commitment? 
It is often very difficult to identify the per-
petrators of cyber attacks. This makes it 
very difficult to legally assess the extent to 
which it is advisable to deploy political, 
legal, intelligence, police and/or military 
resources. In the event of a disaster or an 
attack, the solidarity clause (Article 222 
TFEU) and the assistance clause (Article 
42(7) TEU) permits direct assistance by 
Member States. The solidarity clause en-
sures that all stakeholders at national and 
EU level work together to respond quickly, 
effectively and uniformly to a terrorist 
attack and a natural or manmade disaster. 
The mutual assistance clause contains a 
duty to assist another Member State should 
it be subjected to an armed attack on its 
territory. Except in defence of their own 
country, German soldiers may not be de-
ployed abroad unless it is expressly stipu-
lated in Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz). 
Both the security authorities themselves 
and the laws underpinning their work, 
such as the separation requirement and 
the options of deploying the Bundeswehr 
internally, must at least be critically 
examined. 
3. The EU urgently needs the responsi-
bility to establish resilient network and 
information security systems and this 
responsibility needs to be enshrined in a 
legal regulation. To date, the European 
Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) has been formally responsible for 
ensuring Member States are capable of 
responding rapidly in emergency situations 
and for effective EU-wide cooperation. How-
ever, far too many national critical infra-
structures are still being secured at the 
national or private level. The exchange of 
information on cyber risks is not only weak 
between the EU and its Member States but 
also between the European agencies Euro-
pol, Eurojust, EDA and ENISA. The respon-
sible Directorates-General only work to-
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gether to a limited degree and are often not 
given the necessary information by Member 
States to establish a Europe-wide security 
network. Reform of the EU’s Cybersecurity 
Strategy also aims to further develop the 
role of the EEAS and civilian cyber diplo-
macy instruments, i.e. measures to build 
trust and security such as the Cyber Diplo-
macy Toolbox. At the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) meeting in March 2017 
the EEAS/Commission services presented a 
joint issues paper on a joint EU diplomatic 
response to cyber operations (“Cyber tool-
box”). The latter was welcomed by delega-
tions as well as its suggested follow up in 
the Horizontal Working Party on Cyber 
Issues (HWPCI). Based on this list of sanc-
tions, the EU can take political, financial 
and legal action to respond to those cyber 
attacks that are legally below the threshold 
of an armed conflict. Progress has certainly 
been made on cybersecurity in recent years. 
This applies to technical attribution, issues 
surrounding international law and trust-
building measures in the United Nations 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), the 
OSCE and the G20. 
4. Trust is a scarce resource in interna-
tional relations. In order to generate more 
trust in information and communication 
technologies, additional investment is 
needed in technology, research, develop-
ment and innovation. In August 2016, the 
EU set aside 450 million euros for the 
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation and, therefore, for 
security research. Cybersecurity market 
actors, represented by the European Cyber-
security Organization (ECSO), are to invest 
around three times this figure by 2020. If 
it is true that ‘digitization is the commer-
cialization of research findings by eco-
nomic enterprises’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, August 2016), then calls for inde-
pendent civilian security research will 
quickly fall on deaf ears. Non-governmental 
organizations such as Digital Forensic Re-
search Lab and Big Brother Watch conduct 
important civic investigative work. Critical 
security research is a necessary condition 
for establishing and maintaining societal 
and democratic acceptance of a ‘Europe of 
Security’. National parliaments and the 
European Parliament should ensure that 
overcoming Europe’s crises and setting up 
both a security union and a defence union 
do not come at the expense of liberal val-
ues. Nevertheless, one major challenge here 
will be to guarantee the priority of diplo-
macy over security and military policy, and 
to counteract any excessive securitization. 
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